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Abstract
Using an exhaustive list of Japanese bankruptcy in 1997, we discover a Zipf law for
the distribution of total liabilities of bankrupted firms in high debt range. The life-
time of these bankrupted firms has exponential distribution in correlation with entry
rate of new firms. We also show that the debt and size are highly correlated, so the
Zipf law holds consistently with that for size distribution. In attempt to understand
“physics” of bankruptcy, we show that a model of debtor-creditor dynamics of firms
and a bank, recently proposed by economists, can reproduce these phenomenological
findings.
Key words: Zipf law, firm growth, bankruptcy, balance-sheet, Econophysics
PACS: 89.90.+n, 02.50.-r, 05.40.+j, 47.53.+n
1 Introduction
It is a challenging task to model aggregate dynamics of firms in econophysics.
As such dynamics for firms with considerable amount of money flow is con-
cerned, one can now have evidence of several phenomenological facts about the
dynamics of firms [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12], which are not only interesting in
physics, but also have quite significance in macroeconomics [5,10].
Among those facts are size distribution and growth of firms. Distribution of
firm size such as sales, number of employees, total assets follows a power-law, or
Pareto-Zipf law [1,3,7,8,12]. As for the growth of firms, the distribution of the
logarithm of growth rates has an exponential form and that the fluctuations in
the growth rates scale with the firm size [2,3,4,6,7,9]. While these observation
concerns about stock of a firm, no less important is flow such as profits, whose
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properties of distribution and growth rates have recently observed in empirical
works [11,12].
While these phenomenological facts have been found for living firms, little
is known about the death in aggregate dynamics of a large number of firms.
That is exactly what the present work concerns about. It is important to
uncover phenomenology of how firms die in order to understand the firms
growth dynamics.
In section 2, we make observation of Japanese bankruptcy by using an exhaus-
tive list of bankrupted firms in a year. We show phenomenological findings
about the distribution of total liabilities or debts when bankrupted, the life-
time of bankrupted firms, and correlation between the firm’s debt and size.
These are the main results of this paper. In section 3, we describe a firm’s
financial activity in terms of balance-sheet dynamics. A model for debtor of
firms and creditor of a bank, recently proposed by economists [17], after briefly
recapitulated, is shown to be able to reproduce our findings about bankruptcy.
Summary and discussion is given in section 4. In appendix, we give description
about the nature of bankruptcy dataset employed in this paper.
2 Firms Bankruptcy in Japan
Our data, provided by a domestic data-bank company (Tokyo Shoko Research,
Ltd.), is an exhaustive list of Japanese bankrupted firms in 1997. The data
is exhaustive in the sense that any bankrupted firm with total amount of
debt exceeding 10 million yen (roughly 80,000 euros/dollars) is listed in it.
The number of such firms in the year is 16,526. The data contains informa-
tion of debt, sales, business sector, number of employees, primary bank when
bankrupted, dates of establishment and failure, and stockholders fund when
established. Two remarks immediately follow.
First, bankruptcy or business failure is not a legal term, but should be under-
stood as a critical financial insolvency of a debtor. Typical case and classifica-
tion of different types are given in appendix. What is important for our purpose
here, however, is that most of the cases in the dataset, whatever the types are,
is basically caused by financial insolvency state of the firm. Indeed, out of the
total 16,526 cases, the most frequent one is suspension of bank transactions
(13,850). This liquidity problem (see appendix for details) is considered as the
main cause for other legal and private procedures of bankruptcy.
Second, debt refers to the total sum of liabilities in the credit (“right-hand”)
side of balance-sheet. This quantity, when the firm goes bankrupted, is rela-
tively easy to measure in comparison with other balance-sheet quantities such
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as total asset and equity 2 . Since each item in debt has a creditor outside
of the firm, so the quantity is not basically hidden inside. Actual measure-
ment of the amount of debt is based either on legal documents or on inves-
tigation of current/non-current liabilities in balance-sheet plus the amount of
bills discounted and transfers by endorsement, according to legal and private
procedure for bankruptcy, respectively.
We used the entire dataset in what follows.
2.1 Distribution of debt
Fig. 1 shows the cumulative probability distribution of debt when the firm
was bankrupted. For large debts exceeding 108 yen, we can observe a power-
law distribution over three orders of magnitude or even more. The probability
that a given bankrupted firm has debt equal to or greater than x, denoted by
P>(x), obeys
P>(x) ∝ x
−µ, (1)
with a constant µ, the so-called Pareto index for bankruptcy. The index was
estimated as µ = 0.911± 0.008 (by least-square-fit for samples equally spaced
in logarithm of rank in the power-law region; error is 90% level). This phe-
nomenological finding is what we call Zipf-law for debt of firms bankrupted. It
was pointed out in [13] that debt may obey Zipf-law, but unfortunately with
a quite limited number of data (corresponding to the tail more than 1011 yen
of debt).
2.2 Life-time of bankrupted firms
No less interesting than how large a firm can fail is the problem of how long a
failed firm lived. Fig. 2 gives the cumulative distribution of life-time τ , P>(τ),
for the same set of bankrupted firms. With this plot being semi-log, it is
observed that the entire distribution follows an exponential distribution. We
also see that the distribution has a sudden drop and kink in the shape.
In order to quantify the shape of P>(τ), let us introduce a function defined by
h(t) =
−dP>(t)
dt
P>(t)
. (2)
2 Debt here is not net liabilities defined by the total liabilities minus the amount
of assets not hypothecated, which is difficult to know.
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It is easily seen from the right-hand side expression of eq. (2) that for a
sufficiently small time-interval ∆t, h(t)∆t is the probability that the life-time
τ satisfies t < τ < t+∆t under the condition that τ ≥ t. This function has a
similar notion as hazard rate function in probability (see [15] for example). If
h(t) is constant h0, then P>(t) = exp(−h0t). h(t) has the physical dimension
of inverse of time.
From P>(t) in Fig. 2, we estimate the derivative in eq. (2) by doing moving-
average of stepwise slopes over one year. The resulting h(t) is given in Fig. 3 (a).
h(t) is nearly constant over 30 years, but takes large values for about 10 years
right after the World War II. In general, the number of firm t years old can be
estimated by multiplying the number of firms born t years ago by the prob-
ability of survival of a firm to an age of t years. Therefore, if the process of
survival is homogeneous in time, the time-scale in h(t) comes from entry rate
of new firms. Fig. 3 (b) is the historical record of entry of firms [16]. One
can observe that the 10 years period of high h(t) corresponds to the period
of extremely high birth-rate right after the world war II for about 10 years.
This was brought about by the dissolution of zaibatsu (corporate alliances)
monopoly under the government by U.S. General Headquarters (from 1945 to
1952). One can also note that h(t) has the same order of magnitude as the
entry rate of firms by converting time from days to years all over the history.
2.3 Correlation between firm size and debt when bankrupted
Since it has been known 3 that firm size follows Zipf law [1,3,7,8,12], let us take
a look at relation between firm size and firm debt right before bankruptcy.
Fig. 4 shows a clear correlation between them. Here the firm size is measured
by sales right before bankruptcy. The number of employees, as a proxy of firm
size, gives similar result as for sales. The bigger a firm is, the larger its debt
is when failed.
To quantify this relation, denoting sales of a bankrupted firm by s, we use
the ratio A = x/s where debt x and sales s are given in the same units of
money. Introduce the logarithm of A as a = log10(A), and we examined the
probability density of a, P (a), in Fig. 5 (filled dots) by using all the data
x > 108 (yen), which corresponds to the Pareto-Zipf range in eq. (1). It is
found that the probability density function P (a) is exponential distribution
with skewness, i.e., with different slopes for a > 0 and a < 0. The side of a > 0
is fatter than the other side because a positive a means that the firm is nearer
to the state of insolvency.
Furthermore, we show that the ratio does not depend statistically on which
3 But see also another paradigm [14].
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range of debt is being observed. Preparing bins as x ∈ [108+0.4(n−1), 108+0.4n]
yen (n = 1, · · · , 4), we can examine the conditional probability density, P (a|x),
for each bin of x. Fig. 5 shows that statistical dependence of the ratio on the
value of debt is very weak. This means that the relation between firm size and
debt is multiplicative with multiplying factor A drawn from the distribution
given in Fig. 5. If the statistical independence between A and s holds over
the entire range of the variables, the probability density for log x is equal
to the convolution of the one for a = logA and the one for log s. If s has
a power-law distribution with a Pareto index, then x will have a power-law
with the same Pareto index. Though being a non-rigorous argument because
of the breakdown of power-law under some threshold and of the statistical
independence, this give us a basic idea that the Zipf law for firm size and that
for firm debt when bankrupted are closely related to one another.
3 Balance-sheet dynamics of firm
3.1 What is a firm?
In order to understand how firms die, let us consider the activity of a firm
from the viewpoint of money flow.
A firm makes activity by producing goods or services in anticipation to be
demanded by consumers, and to yield profit. For the firm to realize the pro-
duction and selling of goods and services, it must usually invest more money
than what it actually possesses with a fund by the firm’s owners or stockhold-
ers. The investment is done not only for cost of sales, expenses of selling, etc.
but also for additional facility, production line, employment etc.
A firm’s activity has three facets in general:
(1) finance
borrowing money from banks, market investors
(2) investment
spending money in anticipation of future return of profits
(3) collecting
earning profits from the sales of good and services
In other words, these three facets imply (1) the presence of creditor (borrower),
(2) that investment can be a source of risk, because (3) return of profits has
uncertainty in realization.
The above description can be formulated in terms of stock and flow of money.
5
Flow is inflow of money in a period of time, and stock is the accumulation
of flow over time. Stock of a firm is its balance sheet which consists of asset,
debt and equity (see Fig. 6). Here asset refers to all the assets possessed by
the firm which are expected to yield profits. The asset can be classified into
equity and debt according to how it is financed, either by stockholders or by
loan from banks and market, respectively.
Temporal change of balance-sheet is determined by flow. One source of flow is
profit which is basically given by sales minus cost of sales, finance, and others.
The other flow is investment which is determined by the firm’s decision based
on anticipation of profits. Since the investment is covered by additional debt,
it also depends on creditor’s activity.
Balance sheet dynamics is the temporal change of asset and debt. Debt is
necessary for making profits, but is a source of risk since it can diminish equity
and can dominate the balance sheet. Financial fragility can be measured either
by flow variable such as insolvency (the ratio between debt commitments to
profits) or by stock variable such as liquidity (the ratio between debt and
capital). Persistent state of insolvency results in liquidity problem. Actually
the most cases of bankruptcies (see Appendix) are due to the problem of
liquidity.
3.2 Aggregate dynamics of creditor and debtors
Recently a model for the dynamics of balance sheets of a bank and firms
are proposed in [17], which is based on their previous model for aggregate
dynamics of firms [18]. This model of creditor-debtor dynamics has two ele-
ments; competition between firms by their sizes, and debtor-creditor relation
between a bank and each firm.
In this section, let us briefly recapitulate the model (see [17] for details) and
show by simulation that our phenomenological findings about bankruptcy can
be reproduced in the model.
A firm i has, at time t−1, asset Kit−1, debt L
i
t−1 and equity A
i
t−1 which satisfy
the identity:
Kit−1 = L
i
t−1 + A
i
t−1. (3)
i = 1, · · · , n where n is the number of firms. In the period of time from time
t − 1 to t, the firm makes the following activity with Kit to be determined
below. It produces an output φKit (0 < φ < 1), which is to yield revenue
with uncertainty. At the same time, the firms has financial cost, comprised of
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dividend for equity and interest rate for debt. The profit in the current period
is
piit = u
i
tφK
i
t − r
i
tK
i
t , (4)
where rit is interest-rate for the firm i. Here u
i
t is a stochastic variable rep-
resenting the uncertainty in making profit. In the second term, the ratio of
dividend to equity is assumed to be equal to the interest rate.
Supposing rit is a parameter, the firm plans the amount of investment during
the current period. Since the profit piit is proportional to the total asset K
i
t , the
firm could increase its size by investment. But the bigger the size is, the larger
the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy is, in the presence of uncertainty for profit.
As a simplest form, the objective function for determining the investment is
assumed to have a quadratic term of Kit . Namely, the maximization of the
expectation:
E[piit − c(K
i
t)
2] (5)
yields an optimal value of Ki∗t . Then the investment in the current term is
I it = K
i∗
t −K
i
t−1 (6)
for the realization of which the firm demand loan of the amount
L
i(d)
t = L
i
t−1 − pi
i
t−1 + I
i
t . (7)
In this model the demand is assumed to be always fulfilled by bank with
an appropriate interest-rate. Therefore balance sheet updates by Kit = K
i∗
t ,
Lit = L
i(d)
t , and A
i
t = K
i
t−L
i
t, once the interest rate r
i
t is determined as shortly
given.
Bank is monopolistic and responsible for all the loans to firms. Its balance
sheet is composed of loan Lt−1 as asset, deposit Dt−1 as debt, and equity Et−1
of itself:
Lt−1 = Dt−1 + Et−1. (8)
The total supply of loans is usually determined by the ratio of asset to equity,
so is assumed here as
Lt−1 =
1
α
Et−1 (9)
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with a parameter 0 < α < 1. The supply of loan to each firm is assumed to
be based of collateral of firm asset.
L
i(s)
t = Lt
Kit−1∑n
j=1K
j
t−1
(10)
This is where competition between firms is in effect. Then the interest-rate
for each firm is determined by L
i(s)
t = L
i(d)
t . The bank’s profit is revenue from
interests minus the financial cost of the bank
Πit =
n∑
i=1
ritL
i
t − (r¯t − ω)Lt (11)
where
r¯t =
n∑
i=1
Lit
Lt−1
(12)
and ω is a parameter for profit markup.
The bank faces uncertainty of firms bankruptcy. A firm goes into bankruptcy
when its equity becomes negative. Bankrupted firms are replaced with new
ones with initial and same balance sheet. The update for the bank’ is thus
given by
Et = Et−1 +Πt −
n∑
i=1
Bit−1 (13)
where Bit−1 is −A
i
t−1 for every firm i bankrupted (A
i
t−1 < 0), otherwise 0.
The dynamics of this system was investigated by simulation in [17]. It was
found that the model has, in a stationary phase, skewed distribution of firms
sizes with power-law, Laplace distributed growth rates, and that small idiosyn-
cratic shocks generate large aggregate fluctuations. We used the same set of
parameters: c = 1, φ = 0.1, α = 0.08, ω = 0.002 except the number of firms
n = 105 (much larger than 102 in original). The stochastic variable uit obeys a
uniform distribution with support (0,2). The results of simulation are robust
with other set of parameters, and with the number of firms.
Our new findings from the simulation is given in Fig. 7. We can observe that
the distributions of debt and life-time for bankrupted firms have the same
qualitative results as in the real data. These results are also robust for different
parameters.
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4 Summary and Discussion
Firms growth and failure are the two sides of the same coin. In this paper, we
have uncovered the phenomenology of firms bankruptcy by using an exhaustive
list of Japanese bankruptcies in 1997. Namely, for high-debt regime
(1) debt of bankrupted firms follows Zipf distribution
(2) debt and size of such firms are related by multiplicative factor indepen-
dent of the amount of debt
(3) bankrupted firms have life-time whose distribution is exponential but
correlates with entry rate of new firms
The origin of Zipf law in firms bankruptcy might be well captured in the
model [17], which was shown to reproduce the phenomenological properties
in bankruptcy. Indeed the model shares the aspect of self-organized criticality
[19] (see also [20]) as discussed briefly in what follows.
Failure of a firm can have tremendous influence to economic activities in
macroscopic scale. This is because the default of a single firm can propa-
gate its effect through a network of creditor-debtor relationship. In the model,
a bankrupted firm leaves the market without paying back its debt and debt
commitments to bank. Then the banking system suffers from a capital loss,
resulting in the shrink of credit supply. Such shrink accompanied with rise of
interest rates is likely to strengthen the competition between firms for seek of
more credit and then to deteriorate the firms balance-sheets. But this results
in the growing probability of bankruptcy. This is a “domino effect”. The model
also shows the opposite case of financially infragile or sound state of firms and
bank which leads growth of the total credit and so that of total production
(since the system is assumed to have enough money supply when necessary).
During this process of debtor-creditor dynamics, all the firms are competing in
their sizes having the risk of bankruptcies. The risk is shared by the bank who
attempts to make profit by interest rate. Note that the model has essentially
no fine-tuning parameter for having µ = 1 in eq. (1) and the Zipf law in
firms size. In this respect, the model differs from the traditional approach of
stochastic processes for firms growth and failure (see [21] for mid-60’s nice
review) including entry-exit processes, collective risk theory, etc. Rather it is
the heterogeneous interacting and competing agents that brings about critical
state in the aggregate dynamics of firms (see [22] for this new direction).
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Fig. 1. Distribution of firms debt when bankrupted. The number of data amounts
to 16526 firms bankrupted in the year of 1997.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of life-time for bankrupted firms. Time is given in units of
days. It should be understood that the data may not contain the precise date of
the firm’s establishment, and can include one-month error. The two dotted lines
show 10 years right after the world war II, during which the birth-rate of firms was
extremely higher than other epochs.
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Fig. 3. (a) Estimation of h(t) (per days) define in eq. (2). t is in units of 364 days
and increases towards past. (b) Entry rate (per year) of new firms. Annual record
of entry rate was made as described in [16]. t is given in years (lower tics) and in
A.D. (upper). Data for 1944 and 1945 (the end of the World War II) are missing.
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Fig. 4. Scatter plot for debt and sales (both in units of million yen). The values of
sales refer to annual sales most recently available before bankruptcy.
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Fig. 5. Probability density P (a) (filled dots) for the logarithmic ratio a between
debt x and sales s, a = log10(x/s). Also shown are probability densities P (a|x) con-
ditioned on the value of debt, x ∈ [108+0.4(n−1), 108+0.4n] (yen), where n = 1, · · · , 4.
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Fig. 6. Balance sheet dynamics. From time t to time t+1 the stock of asset composed
of debt and equity is subject to change according to the flow of realized profit and
investment during the period.
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Fig. 7. (a) Cumulative probability distribution of debts bankrupted in a time step
during a stationary phase. (b) Cumulative probability distribution of life-time for
the same family of bankrupted firms. The horizontal value is in arbitrary units for
both plots.
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A Bankruptcy data
Bankruptcy or business failure is not a legal term, but should be understood
as a commonly used term to describe a state of critical financial insolvency of
a debtor. A typical case of bankruptcy is a suspension of banking transactions
(see below). What are also termed bankruptcy are: filing to the court for
bankruptcy proceedings or a corporate rehabilitation procedure, or informing
the aggravation of financial condition of the debtor and delegating creditors
to handle it.
Types of bankruptcy are legally divided into legal and private procedures. The
former procedure has purpose for rehabilitation or liquidation. Rehabilitation
is done by either of Corporate Reorganization Law, Civil Rehabilitation Law
(since 2000), Corporate Arrangement under the Commercial Code, or Com-
position Law (abandoned in 2000). Liquidation is done by Special Liquidation
or by “Bankruptcy”. Private procedure, on the other hand, refers to either
Suspension of Bank Transactions or Internal Arrangement. The number of
each bankruptcy types in 1997 is as follows:
bankruptcy type number
private procedure
Suspension of Bank Transactions 13850
Internal Arrangement 501
legal procedure for rehabilitation
Composition Law 195
Corporate Reorganization 23
Corporate Arrangement 12
legal procedure for liquidation
“Bankruptcy” 1877
Special Liquidation 68
total 16526
The most frequent case is suspension of bank transactions. Concerning with
the bill and check clearings, clearing houses practice a punishment system
against the entity who committed dishonored bills or checks in order to main-
tain the public credibility. The bills or checks which a debtor fails to settle
within the term shall be “dishonored”. The second dishonor within six months
after the first one shall result in publishing the debtor’s name on the ”the re-
port on suspension of banking transactions.”
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Then the debtor shall be barred from transactions with any member financial
institutions of the same clearinghouse for two years from the date of suspen-
sion, being prohibited from opening trade accounts, drawing bills or checks,
and receiving loans. In actuality, this is equivalent to bankruptcy of the firm.
In summary, we regard this case as liquidity problem, and also consider that
other legal and private procedures are basically due to the same problem (debt
growth).
20
